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 The Biosemiotic Approach in Biology : 
 Theoretical Bases and Applied Models 
 Jo ã o Queiroz, Claus Emmeche, Kalevi Kull, and Charbel El-Hani 
 Biosemiotics is a growing fi eld that investigates semiotic processes in the 
living realm in an attempt to combine the fi ndings of the biological sci-
ences and semiotics. Semiotic processes are more or less what biologists 
have typically referred to as  “ signals, ”  “ codes, ” and  “ information pro-
cessing ” in biosystems, but these processes are here understood under 
the more general notion of  semiosis , that is, the production, action, and 
interpretation of signs. Thus, biosemiotics can be seen as biology inter-
preted as a study of living sign systems — which also means that semiosis 
or sign process can be seen as the very nature of life itself. In other words, 
biosemiotics is a fi eld of research investigating semiotic processes 
(meaning, signifi cation, communication, and habit formation in living 
systems) and the physicochemical preconditions for sign action and 
interpretation. 
 To treat biosemiotics as  biology interpreted as sign systems study is 
to emphasize an important intertheoretical relation between biology as 
we know it (as a fi eld of inquiry) and semiotics (the study of signs). 
Biosemiotics offers a way of understanding life in which it is considered 
not just from the perspectives of physics and chemistry, but also from a 
view of living systems that stresses the role of signs conveyed and inter-
preted by other signs in a variety of ways, including by means of mol-
ecules. In this sense, biosemiotics takes for granted and preserves the 
complexity of living processes as revealed by the existing fi elds of biology, 
from molecular biology to brain science and behavioral studies. However, 
biosemiotics attempts to bring together separate fi ndings of the various 
disciplines of biology (including evolutionary biology) into a sign-
theoretical perspective concerning the central phenomena of the living 
world, from the ribosome to the ecosystem and from the beginnings of 
life to its ultimate meanings. From this perspective, no positivist (i.e., 
theory-reductionist) form of unifi cation is implied, but simply a broader 
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approach to life processes in general, paying attention to the location of 
biology between the psychological (the humanities) and the physical 
(natural) sciences. 
 Furthermore, by incorporating new concepts, models, and theories 
from biology into the study of signs, biosemiotics attempts to shed new 
light on some of the unsolved questions within the general study of sign 
processes (semiotics), such as the question about the origins of signifi ca-
tion in the universe (e.g.,  Hoffmeyer 1996 ), and the major thresholds in 
the levels and evolution of semiosis ( Sebeok 1997 ;  Deacon 1997 ;  Kull 
2000 ;  N ö th 2000 ). Here, signifi cation (and sign action) is understood in 
a broad sense, that is, not simply as the transfer of information, but also 
as the generation of the very content and meaning of that information 
in all living sign producers and sign receivers. 
 Sign processes are thus taken as real: they are governed by regularities 
(habits, or natural rules) that can be discovered and explained. They are 
intrinsic in living nature, but we can access them — not directly, but 
indirectly through other sign processes (e.g., scientifi c measurements and 
qualitative distinction methods) — even though the human representation 
and understanding of these processes in the construction of explanations 
is built up as a separate scientifi c sign system distinct from the organisms ’ 
own sign processes. 
 One of the central characteristics of living systems is the highly orga-
nized character of their physical and chemical processes, partly based 
upon informational and molecular properties of what has been described 
in the 1960s as the genetic code (or, more precisely, organic codes). Dis-
tinguished biologists, such as Ernst  Mayr (1982) , have seen these infor-
mational aspects as one of the emergent features of life, namely, as a set 
of processes that distinguishes life from everything else in the physical 
world, except perhaps human-made computers. However, while the 
informational teleology of computer programs are derived, qua being 
designed by humans to achieve specifi c goals, the teleology and informa-
tional characteristics of organisms are intrinsic, qua having evolved natu-
rally, through adaptational and evolutionary processes. The reductionist 
and mechanistic tradition in biology (and philosophy of biology) has seen 
such processes as being purely physical and having to do with only effi -
cient causation. Biosemiotics is an attempt to use the concepts of semiot-
ics in the sense employed by Charles Sanders Peirce to answer questions 
about the biological emergence of meaning, intentionality, and a psycho-
logical world ( CP 5:484 ). 1 Indeed, these are questions that are hard to 
answer within a purely mechanistic and reductionist framework. 
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 The term  “ biosemiotic ” was fi rst used by F. S. Rothschild in 1962, 
but Thomas Sebeok has done much to popularize the term and the fi eld. 2 
Apart from Charles Peirce (1939 – 1914) and Charles Morris (1901 –
 1979), early pioneers of biosemiotics were Jakob von Uexk ü ll (1864 –
 1944), Heini Hediger (1908 – 1992), and Giorgio Prodi (1928 – 1987), and 
the founding fathers were Thomas Sebeok (1920 – 2001) and Thure von 
Uexk ü ll (1908 – 2004). After 2000, an institutionalization of biosemiotics 
can be noticed: since 2001, annual international meetings of biosemioti-
cians have been taking place (initially organized by the Copenhagen and 
Tartu groups); in 2004, the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies 
was established (with Jesper Hoffmeyer as its fi rst president; see  Favareau 
2005 ); the specialized publications  Journal of Biosemiotics (Nova 
Science) and  Biosemiotics (Springer) have appeared; several collections 
of papers have characterized the scope and recent projects in biosemiot-
ics, such as a special issue of  Semiotica 127 (1/4) (1999),  Sign Systems 
Studies 30 (1) (2002),  Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 1992 ,  Witzany 2007 , 
and  Barbieri 2007 . 
 Also, from the 1960s to the 1990s, the semiotic approach in biology 
was developed in various branches: 
 a.  Zoosemiotics, the semiotics of animal behavior and communication 
 b.  Cellular and molecular semiotics, the study of organic codes and 
protolinguistic features of cellular processes 
 c.  Phytosemiotics, or sign processes in plant life 
 d.  Endosemiotics, or sign processes in the organism ’ s body 
 e.  Semiotics in neurobiology 
 f.  Origins of semiosis and semiotic thresholds 
 Biosemiotics sees the molecular evolution of life and the evolution of 
semiotic systems as two aspects of the same process. The scientifi c 
approach to the origin and evolution of life, partly due to the success of 
molecular biology, has given us highly valuable accounts of the outer 
aspects of the whole process, but has overlooked the inner qualitative 
aspects of sign action, and has led to a reductionist view of causality. 
Complex, self-organized, living systems are also governed by formal and 
fi nal causality: formal causality in the sense of the downward causation 
from a whole structure (such as the organism) to its individual molecules, 
constraining their action, but also endowing them with functional 
meanings in relation to the whole metabolism, and fi nal causality, in the 
sense of the tendency to take habits and to generate future interpretants 3 
of the present sign actions. 4 Here, biosemiotics draws also upon the 
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insights of fi elds like systems theory, theoretical biology, and the study 
of complex self-organized systems. 
 Particular scientifi c fi elds like molecular biology, cognitive ethology, 
cognitive science, robotics, and neurobiology deal with information 
processes at various levels, and thus spontaneously provide knowledge 
about biosemiosis (sign action in living systems). Biosemiotics, both as 
a research program and a general perspective on life, would attempt 
to integrate such fi ndings, and to build a semiotic foundation for 
biology. By describing the continuity between body and mind, biosemi-
otics also helps us to understand the evolution of kinds of mind in 
living systems, thereby assisting in overcoming some forms of Carte-
sian dualism that are still haunting the philosophy of mind. In addi-
tion, it develops specifi c models of life processes (such as those 
proposed here for the genetic information system and signaling systems, 
discussed shortly), emphasizing their signifying nature, thus helping 
to enrich and complement the biological sciences as standardly 
understood. 
 In what follows, we will draw on Peirce ’ s semiotics to construct 
two semiotic models: one of the cell ’ s genetic sign system, the other 
of signal transduction in B cell activation. In this manner, we intend to 
shed light on the notion of information as employed in the biological 
sciences. 
 A Theoretical Basis for a Biosemiotic Approach  to Living Systems 
 The concept of information and related notions in biology should be 
not only taken seriously, but also clarifi ed by employing appropriate 
conceptual tools. The use of semiotic concepts and theories to inter-
pret  “ information talk ” can signifi cantly contribute to a precise and 
coherent formulation of the whole set of notions related to the infor-
mation concept in biology. A semiotic treatment of biological informa-
tion can also help to clarify some misunderstandings about the role of 
genes in biological systems, avoiding much criticized notions such as 
genetic blueprints and programs (see, e.g.,  Oyama 2000 ;  Nijhout 1990 ; 
 Sarkar 1996 ;  El-Hani 1997 ;  Keller 2000 ), while preserving the concept 
of biological information, albeit radically reinterpreted. A semiotic 
approach also lends support to the now widely accepted idea that 
there is more to information in living systems than just genetic 
information. 
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 Here, however, our primary aim is to demonstrate how some central 
notions of Peirce ’ s semiotics can be used to model information processes 
in biological systems. We will specifi cally address works in applied semi-
otics in which we developed analyses of genetic information and signal-
ing systems grounded in Peirce ’ s theory of signs ( Queiroz, Emmeche, and 
El-Hani 2005 ;  El-Hani, Queiroz, and Emmeche 2006 ;  El-Hani, Arnellos, 
and Queiroz 2007 ). In other papers, we presented semiotic analyses of 
communication processes in nonhuman animals ( Queiroz and Ribeiro 
2002 ;  Ribeiro et al. 2007 ). The analyses offered here are not, however, 
the only way to apply semiotics to particular cases. It is important to 
notice that there are other ways of applying semiotics to biology that are 
not based on the semiotics of Peirce (e.g.,  Marko š 2002 ;  Barbieri 2003 ). 
As a fi rst step in our argument, we will discuss the status of information 
talk in biology. 
 Information Talk in Biology 
 During the 1950s and 1960s, genetics, cytology, and molecular biology 
were swamped by terms borrowed from information theory. This  “ infor-
mation talk ” or  “ quasi semiotics, ” still pervades these fi elds, including 
widely used terms such as  “ genetic code, ”  “ messenger RNA, ”  “ transcrip-
tion, ”  “ translation, ”  “ transduction, ”  “ recognition, ”  “ genetic informa-
tion, ”  “ chemical signals, ”  “ cell signaling, ” and so on. But as the concept 
of information and its plethora of associated notions were introduced in 
biology, so were several problems with which the tradition of biology 
was unprepared to cope. Instead of deepening the discussion about the 
problems involved in information talk, the trend in the biological sci-
ences was one of treating information as merely sequence information 
in DNA or proteins. 
 Some researchers consider information talk as inadequate and merely 
metaphorical, thus expressing skepticism about the use of the term 
 “ information ” and its derivatives in biology ( Stuart 1985 ;  Sarkar 1996 ). 
We disagree with this position, claiming instead that the notion of infor-
mation and other related ideas grasp some fundamental features of 
biological systems and processes that might be otherwise neglected. The 
terms  “ code, ”  “ information, ”  “ signals, ”  “ message, ”  “ signaling, ” and so 
on can be seen as necessary to understand the organization of relations 
in living beings in such a way that makes it clear that what happens in 
such beings is much more than simple chemistry. Bray, for instance, 
argues that  “ organisms can be viewed as complex information-
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processing systems, where molecular analysis alone may not be suffi -
cient ” (cited by  Williams 1997 , 476 – 477).  Ideker, Galitski, and Hood 
(2001) , in a paper about systems biology, maintain that biology is an 
informational science. Indeed, since the early applications of cybernetic 
models in life sciences, biology has been increasingly conceptualized as 
a communication and information science (e.g.,  Keller 2005 ), even 
though in many cases it is not clear at all what is meant by  “ informa-
tion ” in biology ( Emmeche 1994 ;  Griffi ths 2001 ;  Jablonka 2002 ; 
 Jablonka and Lamb 2005 ). 
 It is not surprising, then, that biologists felt the need to talk about 
information when delving into the molecular microstructure of living 
systems. Life scientists needed a way of conveying the idea that more 
than just physics and chemistry is going on there. Even though all cellular 
processes are physicochemical processes, they are  complexly organized 
physicochemical processes interwoven in communication and informa-
tion networks. In this context, it is quite diffi cult to see what would be 
the real advantage of stripping away information talk from biology, 
instead of making it more precise and exploring its consequences in more 
depth. Thus, the problem is not getting rid of information talk, but rather 
clarifying it by using an appropriate theoretical framework. 
 As  Griffi ths (2001) summarizes the problem, genetic information is a 
metaphor in search of a theory. We believe this applies, in general terms, 
to information talk in biology. One possibility for building a theory of 
information in biology is to rely on the mathematical theory of com-
munication. This theory allows one to defi ne the amount of information 
as the measure of the probability of selection of a particular message 
among the set of all possible messages. The probabilistic measure of 
information provided by this theory is nonsemantic, and hence indiffer-
ent to meaning ( Shannon and Weaver 1949 ;  Cover and Thomas 1999 ; 
 Jablonka 2002 ). It is true that this meaning-free concept of information 
can be useful in biological research for several purposes ( Adami 2004 ). 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that such a nonsemantic (and quantita-
tive) understanding of information is not suffi cient for a theory of 
biological information, and should be complemented by a semantic, 
pragmatic (and more qualitative) approach.  Jablonka (2002) , for instance, 
uses an example where a DNA sequence encoding a functional enzyme 
and a same-length sequence coding for a completely nonfunctional poly-
peptide (which can have only a single different nucleotide) would contain, 
according to the above-mentioned measure, the same amount of infor-
mation. It is obvious, however, that these two messages do not mean the 
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same to the cell. This indicates the necessity of a treatment of informa-
tion in biology that includes a semantic and a pragmatic dimension. Or, 
to put it differently, a theory of biological information should also deal 
with the meaning of messages and the context in which they are inter-
preted. Here, we use semiotic concepts to build a semantic and pragmatic 
account of biological information. In particular, we propose a model of 
information as semiosis, grounded in Peirce ’ s pragmatic theory of signs. 
 Peircean Semiotics: A Brief Introduction 
 Peirce is often considered the founder of modern semiotics ( Weiss and 
Burks 1945 , 386). Semiotics was defi ned by Peirce as  “ the doctrine of 
the essential and fundamental nature of all varieties of possible semioses ” 
( CP 5:484 ). Semiotics describes and analyzes the structure of semiotic 
processes independently of their material bases, or of the conditions 
under which they can be observed: inside cells (cytosemiosis), among 
tissues and cell populations (vegetative semiosis), in animal communica-
tion (zoosemiosis), or in typically human activities (production of nota-
tions, metarepresentations, etc.). In other words, Peirce ’ s concept of 
semiotics concerns a theory of signs in its most general sense. Peirce 
conceived general semiotics much like a formal science as mathematics 
is ( CP 2:227 ). However, semiotics fi nds the objects of its investigation 
in the sign ’ s concrete, natural environment and in  “ normal human 
experience ” ( CP 1:241 ). 
 Semiotics is subdivided into speculative grammar, critical logic, and 
speculative rhetoric ( CP 2:229 ). The fi rst division of this science is what 
interests us here. Its task is that of examining the  “ sign physiology of all 
kinds ” ( CP 2:83 ), that is, the concrete nature of signs as they emerge and 
develop, and the conditions that determine the sign ’ s further develop-
ment, nature, and interpretation. It is the branch that investigates (1) the 
conditions to which any and every kind of sign must be submitted, (2) 
the sign itself, and (3) its true nature ( CP 1:444 ). As one of its tasks, 
speculative grammar elaborates on the classifi cations of signs or, in other 
words, the diversity of sign types and how they merge with one another 
to create complex semiotic processes. For  Houser , the logician  “ who 
concentrates on speculative grammar investigates representation rela-
tions (signs), seeks to work out the necessary and suffi cient conditions 
for representing, and classifi es the different possible kinds of representa-
tion ” ( 1997 , 9). Between 1867 and 1911, Peirce developed a model of 
signs as processes, actions, and relations, and also elaborated divisions 
of signs in order to describe different kinds of semiotic processes. 
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 Peirce ’ s pragmatic model of meaning as the  “ action of signs ” (semio-
sis) has had a deep impact (besides all branches of semiotics) on philoso-
phy, psychology, theoretical biology, and cognitive sciences (see  Freeman 
1983 ;  Fetzer 1997 ;  Colapietro 1989 ;  Tiercelin 1995 ;  Hoffmeyer 1996 ; 
 Deacon 1997 ;  Freadman 2004 ;  Hookway 2002 ). First and foremost, 
Peirce ’ s semiotics is grounded in a list of categories — namely, Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness — which corresponds to an exhaustive system 
of hierarchically organized classes of relations ( Houser 1997 ). This 
system makes up the formal foundation of Peirce ’ s philosophy ( Parker 
1998 ) and his model of semiotic action ( Murphey 1993 ). 
 In brief, the categories can be defi ned as follows: 
 1.  Firstness: what something is, without reference to anything else. 
 2.  Secondness: what something is, in relation to something else, but 
without relation to any third entity. 
 3.  Thirdness: what something is, insofar as it is capable of bringing a 
second entity into relation to a fi rst one in the same way that it brings 
itself into relation to the fi rst and the second entities. 
 Firstness is the category of vagueness and novelty:  “ fi rstness is the mode 
of being which consists in its subject ’ s being positively such as it is 
regardless of anything else. That can only be a possibility ” ( CP 1:25 ). 
Secondness is the category of reaction, opposition, and differentiation: 
 “ generally speaking genuine secondness consists in one thing acting upon 
another, brute action. . . . I consider the idea of any dyadic relation not 
involving any third as an idea of secondness ” ( CP 8:330 ). Finally, Third-
ness is the category of mediation, habit, generality, evolution, and 
conceptualization ( CP 1:340 ). 5 
 Semiosis and Information Processing 
 According to Peirce ( CP 2:171, 2:274 ), any description of semiosis 
should necessarily treat it as a relation constituted by three irreducibly 
connected terms: sign-object-interpretant (S-O-I). Hereafter, we will 
refer to these terms of a triadic relation as S, O, and I, and to the triadic 
relation in itself, as  “ triad ” (see  fi gure 4.1 ). As the reader will note 
in  fi gure 4.1 , this triadic relationship communicates/conveys a form 
from the object to the interpretant through the sign (symbolized by 
the horizontal arrow). The other two arrows indicate that the form 
is conveyed from the object to the interpretant through a determination 
of the sign by the object, and a determination of the interpretant by the 
sign. 
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 For Peirce, a sign is something that stands for something other than 
itself. Peirce defi ned signs in several different ways ( Marty and Lang 
1997 ), but here we will highlight the defi nitions that will be useful in 
our work. He conceived a sign as a  “ First which stands in such a genuine 
triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, so as to be capable of 
determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic 
relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object ” ( CP 
2:274 ; see also  CP 2:303, 2:92, 1:541 ). The triadic relation between S, 
O, and I is regarded by Peirce as irreducible, in the sense that it is not 
decomposable into any simpler relation. Accordingly, the term  “ sign ” 
was used by Peirce to designate the irreducible triadic process between 
S, O, and I, but he also used it to refer to the fi rst term of this triadic 
relation. Some commentators have proposed that we should distinguish 
between the  “ sign in this strict sense ” ( representamen , or sign vehicle), 
when referring to the fi rst term of the triad, and the  “ sign in a broad 
sense ” (or sign process, sign as a whole) (e.g.,  Johansen 1993 ). Signs, 
conceived in the broad sense, are never alone. 
 In Peirce ’ s defi nitions, we fi nd several clues to understand how signs 
act. Any sign is something that stands for something else (its object) in 
such a way that it ends up producing a third relational entity (an inter-
pretant), which is the effect a sign produces on an interpreter. In the 
context of biosemiotics, an interpreter is a biosystem such as a cell or an 
organism. In many biological informational processes, sign interpreta-
tion results in a new sign within the interpreter, which refers to the same 
object to which the former sign refers, or ultimately in an action, which 
can lead to the termination of an informational process. That the inter-
pretant is often another sign, created by the action of a previous sign, is 
clear in the following statement by Peirce: a sign is  “ anything which 
sign
object interpretant
form
 Figure 4.1 
 The semiotic relationship 
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determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which 
itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in 
turn a sign, and so on, ad infi nitum ” ( CP 2:303 ). 
 Accordingly, it is important to bear in mind always that the interpre-
tant is not necessarily the product of a process that amounts to  “ inter-
pretation ” in the sense that we use this term to account for human 
cognitive processes. As explained previously, the fundamental character 
of the interpretant in many biological processes is that it is a new sign 
produced by the action of a previous sign in such a manner that both 
share the same referent, and indeed, refer to it in a similar way. 
 One of the most remarkable characteristics of Peirce ’ s theory of signs 
is its commitment to a process philosophy. As a process thinker, it was 
quite natural that Peirce conceived semiosis as basically a process in 
which triads are systematically linked to one another so as to form a 
web (see  Gomes et al. 2007 ). Peirce ’ s theory of signs has a remarkable 
dynamical nature. According to  Merrell ,  “ Peirce ’ s emphasis rests not on 
content, essence, or substance, but, more properly, on dynamics rela-
tions. Events, not things, are highlighted ” ( 1995 , 78). Thus,  Hausman 
(1993) refers to the complex S-O-I as the focal factor of a dynamical 
process. 
 It is important not to lose sight of the distinction between the inter-
preter, which is the system that interprets the sign, and the interpretant. 
The interpreter is described by Peirce as a  “ Quasi-mind ” ( CP 4:536 ), a 
description that demands, for its proper interpretation, a clear recogni-
tion of Peirce ’ s broad concept of mind ( Ransdell 1977 ;  Santaella-Braga 
1994 ). It is not the case that only conscious beings can be interpreters 
in a Peircean framework. Rather, a translation machinery synthesizing 
proteins from a string of ribonucleic acid (RNA) or a membrane receptor 
recognizing a given hormone can be regarded as interpreters. A basic 
idea in a semiotic understanding of living systems is that these systems 
are interpreters of signs, that is, that they are constantly responding to 
selected signs in their surroundings. An interpreter is anything that 
carries on a sign process. 
 Thus, the interpreter does not have to be a conscious being, not even 
an organism, as it may be some part or subsystem within an organism, 
or a human-designed product. Nevertheless, because a sign process is 
itself an interpreter, the concept of interpreter appears to be secondary 
in Peirce ’ s semiotics, even though it can play a heuristic role in building 
some models of semiotic processes. 
The Biosemiotic Approach in Biology  101
 We also need to consider here Peirce ’ s distinctions regarding the 
nature of objects and interpretants, (For a review of these topics, see 
 Savan 1988 ;  Liszka 1990 ;  Short 1996 .) He distinguishes between the 
immediate and dynamical objects of a sign as follows: 
 We must distinguish between the Immediate Object — i.e., the Object as repre-
sented in the sign — and . . . the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of 
things, the Sign  cannot express, which it can only  indicate and leave the inter-
preter to fi nd out by  collateral experience . ( CP 8:314 ; emphasis in the original) 
 and: 
 We have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the Sign 
itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation 
of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some 
means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation. ( CP 4:536 ) 
 And we should also consider his distinction between three kinds of 
interpretants: 
 The  Immediate Interpretant is the immediate pertinent possible effect in its 
unanalyzed primitive entirety. . . . The  Dynamical Interpretant is the actual effect 
produced upon a given interpreter on a given occasion in a given stage of his 
consideration of the Sign. ( MS 339d:546 – 547 ; emphasis in the original) 
 and: 
 The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter 
is destined to come if the Sign is suffi ciently considered. . . . The Final Interpretant 
is that toward which the actual tends. ( SS 110 – 111 ) 
 Let us fi rst consider Peirce ’ s distinction between the immediate and 
the dynamical objects of a sign. The dynamical object is something in 
reality that determines the sign, but can be represented by the sign only 
in some of its aspects. These aspects that the sign represents are the 
immediate object, that is, the dynamical object in its semiotically avail-
able form, that is, as immediately given to the sign. In another words, 
the immediate object is the dynamical object as the sign represents it (this 
is what we mean by  “ semiotic availability ” ). Because the sign represents 
the dynamical object in some of its features only, never in its totality, it 
can simply indicate that object, and it is left to an interpreter to establish 
what is the dynamical object through the interpreter ’ s competence as a 
user of that sign, which, in turn, results from its previous experience and 
learning to become an interpreter. 6 This is why Peirce claims that the 
interpreter should fi nd out what the dynamical object is by collateral 
experience. The system that is causally affected by the sign should 
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establish which dynamical object the sign indicates through processes 
that have been selected for in the evolutionary history of that kind of 
system. In the ontogenetic timescale, the system will acquire its semiotic 
competence — that is, its competence as a sign interpreter — through 
development. 
 Peirce defi nes the dynamical interpretant as the actual effect of a sign, 
while the immediate interpretant is its  “ range of interpretability ” — the 
range of possible effects that a sign is able to produce (see  Johansen 
1993 , 166 – 167). The dynamical interpretant is thus the instantiation of 
one of the possible effects included in the immediate interpretant. The 
fi nal interpretant in a semiotic process is, in turn, the fi nal state of this 
process, understood as a tendency being realized when a given chain of 
triads is triggered, but not determined or bound to happen, because other 
fi nal states can follow from the semiotic process, as in the case, for 
instance, of misinterpretation. In one way or another, the fi nal interpre-
tant can be seen as temporally solving the instability that is included into 
the sign process. 
 Peirce ( CP 8:177 ) writes that a sign determines an interpretant in some 
 “ actual ” or  “ potential ” mind (in other passages, a  “ Quasi-mind ” ; see 
 CP 4:536 ). It is indeed possible to differentiate between  “ potential ” and 
 “ effective ” semiosis. Potential semiosis is defi ned as a triadically struc-
tured process that is not actually taking place, but has a disposition to 
take place at a given moment; that is, it could occur under the appropri-
ate conditions. Effective semiosis, in turn, concerns a sign that, by being 
actualized, has an actual effect on the interpreter. Semiosis necessarily 
entails the instantiation of chains of triadic relations, as a sign in a given 
triad will lead to the production of an interpretant, which is, in turn, a 
new sign. Therefore, an interpretant is both the third term of a previous 
triad and the fi rst term (sign) of a subsequent triad ( Savan 1988 ; see 
 fi gure 4.2 ). Here, we have a fi rst transition accounting for the dynamical 
nature of semiosis, namely, the interpretant-sign (I-S) transition. By this 
 “ transition, ” we simply mean that the same element that plays the role 
of the interpretant in a triad will play in a subsequent triad the role of 
the sign. After all, from a Peircean perspective, to perform sign process-
ing and interpretation is to produce further (or, as Peirce says, more 
developed) signs. 
 Please also remember that the outline in this section is purely logical 
(or semiotic) and that within a particular physical, chemical, or biologi-
cal system, the semiotic processes described here in general terms can be 
instantiated by different physical means, such as shifts in chemical con-
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centrations or processes of molecular recognition. We will add this mate-
rial aspect when we present our biosemiotic models. 
 When the I-S transition takes place, there is also a change in the 
occupant of the functional role of the immediate object ( fi gure 4.2 ). 
When the interpretant becomes the sign of a new triad, the relation of 
reference to the same dynamical object depends on the fact that the new 
occupant of the role of immediate object stands for the same aspect of 
the dynamical object that the immediate object of a previous triad stood 
for. Thus, an object turns out to be a plural object via semiosis. We 
should stress, however, that instead of using the concept of  reference in 
these models (as it is a highly debated and sometimes unclear concept 
that is not included in Peirce ’ s theory of signs), it might be good to 
replace this concept in future works by a concept internal to Peirce ’ s 
framework: the concept of  ground . 
 As  fi gure 4.2 shows, in a triad  i a given sign S i indicates a dynamical 
object by representing some aspect of it, the immediate object O i . Through 
the triadic relation, an interpretant I i is produced in the semiotic system. 
This interpretant becomes the sign in a subsequent triadic relation, S i +1 , 
which now indicates the same dynamical object. It should indicate this 
object through a new immediate object that corresponds to an aspect of 
the dynamical object represented in the sign. We now have a new occu-
pant of the role of immediate object that stands for the same aspect of 
 Figure 4.2 
 The triadic relation S-O-I forms a chain of triads. The grey area at the bottom of the fi gure 
shows that all signs in the chain of triads refer to the same dynamical object through a 
series of immediate objects. The arrows show the interpretant-sign (I-S) transition and the 
changes in the occupant of the functional role of the immediate object. 
I-S transitions
Change in the occupant of the functional role of O
Si
Oi
Si+1
Oi+1 Oi+2
Ii+1 Si+2 Ii+2Ii
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the dynamical object which was represented in the previous sign, S i . 
It is in this sense that there is a change in the occupant of the 
functional role of the immediate object, from O i in a previous triad to 
O i +1 in a subsequent triad. Through the triadic relation, a further inter-
pretant, I i +1 , will be produced, which will then become the sign in a new 
triad, S i +2 , and thus successively, up to the end of that specifi c sign 
process. 
 Peirce also defi nes a sign as a medium for the communication of a 
form or habit embodied in the object to the interpretant ( De Tienne 
2003 ;  Hulswit 2001 ;  Bergman 2000 ), so as to constrain the interpretant 
as a sign or the interpreter ’ s behavior ( fi gure 4.1 ): 
 A Sign may be defi ned as a Medium for the communication of a Form. . . . As 
a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which deter-
mines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. . . . That which is com-
municated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form; that 
is to say, it is nothing like an existent, but is a power, is the fact that something 
would happen under certain conditions. ( MS 793:1 – 3 )  (See  EP 2:544 , n. 22, for 
a slightly different version.) 
 What is a form? There is a movement in Peirce ’ s writings from  “ form 
as fi rstness ” to  “ form as thirdness. ” Form is defi ned as having the  “ being 
of predicate ” ( EP 2:544 ), and it is also pragmatically formulated as a 
 “ conditional proposition ” stating that certain things would happen 
under specifi c circumstances ( EP 2:388 ). It is nothing like a thing ( De 
Tienne 2003 ), but something that is embodied in the object ( EP 2:544 , 
n. 22) as a habit, a  “ rule of action ” ( CP 5:397 ), a  “ disposition ” ( CP 
2:170 ), a  “ real potential ” ( EP 2:388 ) or, simply, a  “ permanence of some 
relation ” ( CP 1:415 ). Here, we would like to stress that the form 
communicated or conveyed from the object to the interpretant through 
the sign is not the particular shape of an object, or something alike, 
but a regularity, a habit that allows a given semiotic system to interpret 
that form as indicative of a particular class of entities, processes, 
or phenomena, and thus to answer to it in a similarly regular, lawful 
way. Otherwise, the semiotic system would not be really capable of 
interpretation. 
 The communication/conveyance of a form from the object to the 
interpretant constrains the behavior of an interpreter, in the sense that 
it brings about a constrained set of relations between the object and the 
interpretant through the mediation of the sign. We understand the 
 “ meaning ” of a sign, thus, as an effect of the sign — conceived as a 
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medium for the communication/conveyance of forms — on an interpreter 
by means of the triadic relation S-O-I. A meaning process can be thus 
defi ned as the action of a sign (semiosis). 
 In a Peircean approach, information can be strongly associated with 
the concepts of meaning and semiosis. 7 Peirce spoke of signs as  “ convey-
ers, ” as a  “ medium ” ( MS 793 ), as  “ embodying meaning. ” Accordingly, 
in his theory, the notions of meaning, information, and semiosis intersect 
and overlap in different ways (see  Johansen 1993 ). Peirce defi ned 
 “ meaning ” as the consequence of the triadic relation between sign, 
object, and interpretant (S-O-I) as a whole ( EP 2:429 ), and also in terms 
of different correlates of a triad — e.g., object ( MS 11, EP 2:274 ), inter-
pretant ( EP 2:496, EP 2:499; CP 4:536 ; see  Fitzgerald 1966 , 84;  Bergman 
2000 ). In turn, Peirce defi ned  “ information ” at least ordinarily ( CP 
2.418 ) and metaphysically ( CP 2.418 ) as a connection between form and 
matter, and logically ( W 1.276 ) as the product of the extension and 
intension of a concept ( Debrock 1996 ). 
 In the passage quoted earlier from  MS 793 , Peirce defi nes a sign both 
as  “ a Medium for the communication of a Form ” and as  “ a triadic rela-
tion, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it 
determines. ” If we consider both defi nitions of a sign, we can say, then, 
that semiosis is a triadic process of communication/conveyance of a form 
from the object to the interpretant by the sign mediation. And we can 
also stipulate that semiosis is, in a Peircean framework, information. For 
this reason, we systematically refer to  information as the communication/
conveyance of a  form from O to I through S ( Queiroz, Emmeche, and 
El-Hani. 2005 ;  El-Hani, Queiroz, and Emmeche 2006 ;  Queiroz and 
El-Hani 2006a ,  2006b ). 
 According to our interpretation of Peirce ’ s ideas, information has the 
nature of a process: it is a process of communicating a form to the inter-
pretant and operates as a constraining infl uence on possible patterns of 
interpretative behavior. When applying this general semiotic approach 
to biological systems, information will most often be an interpreter-
dependent process. It cannot be dissociated from the notion of a situated 
(and actively distributed) communicational agent (potential or effective). 
It is interpreter-dependent in the sense that information triadically con-
nects representation (sign), object, and an effect (interpretant) on the 
interpreter (which can be an organism or a part of an organism). In a 
biological system, information depends on both the interpreter and the 
object (in which the form communicated in information is embodied as 
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a constraining factor of the interpretative process). Thus, a framework 
for thinking about information as a process can be constructed in 
Peircean terms by employing the following defi nitions: 
 •  Information = semiosis: a triadic-dependent process through which a 
form embodied in the object in a regular way is communicated or con-
veyed to an interpretant through the mediation of a sign. 
 •  Potential information = potential semiosis: a process of communicating 
or conveying a form from an object to an interpretant through the media-
tion of a sign that has a disposition to take place at a given moment, 
changing the state of the interpreter. 
 •  Effective information = effective semiosis: the process by which a sign 
actually produces an effect (interpretant) on some system (an interpreter) 
by making the interpretant stand in a similar relation to the same object 
(the object of the sign) as that in which the sign itself stand. Thus, the 
sign mediates the relation between object and interpretant. The sign 
effectively communicates or conveys, in this way, a form from the object 
to the interpretant, changing the state of the interpreter. 
 Applied Biosemiotics: Modeling Two Semiotic Processes in Cells 
 Semiotic Analysis of Genes and Genetic Information 
 In the genetic information system, the synthesis of proteins and ribo-
nucleic acids (RNAs) is related to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Specifi c 
regions of this molecule act as templates for the transcription of RNAs 
by a multiprotein complex, including RNA polymerase. Messenger 
RNAs (mRNAs) act, in turn, as templates for the synthesis of proteins 
in the cytoplasm. DNA can act as a template for the synthesis of RNA, 
due to the specifi c base pairing of nucleotides, the monomers that con-
stitute nucleic acids, and RNA in turn can act as a template for the 
synthesis of proteins due to specifi c relationships between sequences of 
three nucleotides (codons) and amino acids, the monomers of proteins. 
The set of these relationships amounts to the genetic code (which exists 
in several slightly different versions). 
 The effects of a protein-coding gene on a given cell or organism are 
regulated mainly by control of gene expression at the level of transcrip-
tion initiation. This regulatory process results in the fact that only a 
subset of all genes present in any cell type in a multicellular organism is 
actually expressed. 
 The process by which the nucleotide sequence of mRNA serves as a 
template for the synthesis of proteins is called  translation and is an 
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essential part of protein synthesis. Messenger RNAs are often called the 
 “ vehicles ” of the genetic information transcribed from DNA. The 
message at stake is  “ written ” in the form of a series of codons, each 
specifying a particular amino acid. Another class of RNA molecules, 
transfer RNAs (tRNAs), play a fundamental role in the process of deci-
phering the codons in mRNA. Each type of amino acid has its own subset 
of tRNAs. They act as specifi c transporters, binding amino acids and 
carrying them to the growing end of a polypeptide chain in response to 
specifi c codons in the mRNA. The reason why the correct tRNA with 
its attached amino acid is selected at each step in protein synthesis is that 
each specifi c tRNA molecule contains a three-nucleotide sequence, called 
an  anticodon , which base-pairs with its complementary codon in the 
mRNA. The specifi c relationship between tRNAs and amino acids, in 
turn, results from the attachment of the appropriate amino acid to a 
tRNA in a reaction catalyzed by a specifi c aminoacyl-tRNA synthetase. 
The specifi city of the attachment between amino acids and tRNAs results 
from the capacity of each one of these enzymes to recognize one amino 
acid and all its compatible, or cognate, tRNAs. Therefore, the rules 
captured in the genetic code ultimately depend on the recognition activity 
of aminoacyl-tRNA synthetases. 
 If we now check the terms presented in the previous paragraphs, we 
will be able to see  “ information talk ” in action. Our strategy was to use 
terms that are frequently employed in this same manner in biological 
papers and textbooks in order to highlight the importance of building a 
theory to give a precise meaning to this rather metaphorical language. 
As we mentioned previously,  Griffi ths (2001) wrote that genetic informa-
tion is a metaphor in search of a theory. An analysis of molecular biology 
textbooks ( Pitombo, Rocha de Almeida, and El-Hani 2008 ) shows that 
this is really so, as no idea related to information other than a reference 
to sequence information in DNA or proteins is offered in those textbooks 
as a ground for understanding the  “ information talk ” that pervades 
them. 
 Against this background for understanding the genetic information 
system, we can move on to an analysis of genes and genetic information 
grounded in Peirce ’ s theory of signs (the original sources for this analysis 
are  Queiroz, Emmeche, and El-Hani. 2005 ;  El-Hani, Queiroz, and 
Emmeche 2006 ). From the perspective of this theory, the action of a gene 
as a sign should be understood as a relationship between three elements 
( fi gure 4.3 ). By employing the defi nition of  “ information ” put forward 
previously, genetic information can be thus described as a semiotic 
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process. From this perspective, there is more to genetic information than 
just the sequence of nucleotides in a stretch of DNA. This is an important 
conclusion, as it goes against the treatment of genetic information as 
merely sequence information in DNA or proteins, and indicates a differ-
ent path to conceptualize information, that is, in a theory of biological 
information grounded in Peircean semiotics. 
 In  fi gure 4.3 , a sequence of nucleotides in DNA is not treated as 
information in itself, but as the fi rst correlate of information interpreted 
as semiosis — that is, a sign. Signs in DNA are transcribed into signs in 
mature mRNA, with or without the occurrence of alternative splicing, a 
process through which different patterns of RNA processing lead to a 
number of different mature RNA molecules, each coding for different, 
but related proteins (isoforms). If alternative splicing takes place, a sign 
in DNA will then be used to produce several different signs in mRNA. 
The immediate object of a gene as a sign in DNA is the sequence of 
amino acids or nucleotides represented in it. And as several different 
immediate objects can be represented in DNA (given processes such as 
Signs in DNA
(sequences of
nucleotides)
Signs in
mature mRNA
Alternative splicing
(it may occur or not)
Immediate interpretant: range of
interpretability of a sign in DNA, e.g.,
possibilities of reconstruction of specific
immediate objects
Immediate object: sequence of
AA in a polypeptide or sequence
of nucleotides in an RNA
 Figure 4.3 
 A general semiotic analysis of the gene as a sign. A sign is the mediating element in a 
semiotic process through which a form is communicated from an object to an interpretant. 
This is the reason why we consider the interpretant here as the reconstruction of a form 
(habit) embodied in an object.  “ Reconstruction ” here amounts to a process by which the 
form of a protein in a cell generation is communicated through signs in DNA (in potency) 
to the form of a protein in the next cell generation. Thus, a regularity obtains in the three-
dimensional structure and function of proteins over generations. 
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alternative splicing), there is a range of interpretability of a sign in DNA, 
which amounts to the immediate interpretant. 
 A protein-coding gene, for instance, can become a sign in effective 
action in a cell only by standing — in a triadic-dependent relation — for a 
specifi c sequence of amino acids (immediate object) through a process 
of reconstruction of a specifi c form (interpretant). What is genetic infor-
mation in this scheme? It can be understood as the whole process through 
which a gene acts as a sign in a given cell, mediating the reconstruction 
of a specifi c sequence of amino acids. Information is the triadic-
dependent relation per se; it is a process, not something to be found in 
the fi rst correlate of this process, a sign in DNA. In signs in DNA, we 
can fi nd information only  in potency . When this potential information 
becomes actual information, it is not something contained in isolated 
signs in DNA, but the very process through which those signs act. 
 The relationship between signs in DNA and sequences of amino acids 
in proteins is established by a complex mechanism of interpretation, 
involving transcription, RNA processing, and translation. 8 Thus, to 
interpret a string of DNA, more than one interpretative system is required, 
including, for instance, RNA polymerases, involved in the transcription 
of DNA into RNA, and ribosomes, involved in the translation of mRNA, 
into protein. These interpretative systems are parts or subsystems of a 
cell as a global interpreter, and their actions are subordinated to the 
latter. The idea that the cell can be seen as a global interpreter to which 
a series of interpretative subsystems in the genetic information system 
are subordinated is dramatically reinforced by recent analyses of the 
functional organization of proteomes. Consider, for instance, that the 
multicomponent cellular systems involved in transcription, RNA pro-
cessing, and RNA transport do not form a simple linear assembly line, 
but a complex and extensively coupled network in which signals circulate 
in a nonlinear manner, involving several feedback loops ( Maniatis and 
Reed 2002 ;  Kornblihtt et al. 2004 ). It is this network structure that 
makes possible the coordination of the interpretative subsystems in the 
genetic information system by the cell. 
 It is clear, then, that we cannot easily move from claims at the cellular 
level to claims at the molecular level while pondering which system is 
interpreting genes as signs. It is becoming increasingly clear through 
recent advances in the understanding of cell systems that when a gene is 
interpreted, the interpretation process is indeed taking place at the cel-
lular level, although multicomponent molecular subsystems are necessary 
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to this endeavor. This idea that ultimately the whole cell participates in 
the network necessary for the interpretation that is demanded for the 
effect of a gene product to take place ( Emmeche and Hoffmeyer 1991 ; 
 Pardini and Guimar ã es 1992 ) is further supported by the role of an 
impressive array of signaling pathways regulating the interpretation of 
signs in DNA. As  Fogle observes,  “ DNA action and function become 
meaningful in the context of a cellular system. Coding information in 
the DNA is necessary but insuffi cient for the operation of living systems ” 
( 2000 , 19). 
 Accordingly, a Peircean approach to genes and genetic information 
entails that genetic structures should not be seen in isolation from the 
larger system by which they are interpreted. From this perspective, the 
meaning of a gene to its interpreter, the cell — or, to put it differently, 
the biological meaningfulness of a gene — is found not only in DNA 
sequences in a chromosome. That there is more to genetic information 
than just a sequence of nucleotides in DNA means that we will have 
to include in our models of information the effect of the gene-as-a-sign 
on the cell or organism, and, in fact, the very role of cellular subsystems 
as interpreters of strings of DNA, in such a way that they relate signs 
to specifi c dynamical objects, proteins that play a function inside the 
cellular system and have an effect on it or on the organism of which 
the cell is a part. 
 In a Peircean framework, we move from an identifi cation of genetic 
information with sequential information in DNA to its understanding as 
a triadic-dependent, semiotic process. As a way of stressing the difference 
between an account of information as a process and more usual explana-
tions about what is information, consider, for instance,  Maynard Smith 
and Szathm á ry ’ s (1999 , 9 – 10) argument that information is  “ that some-
thing ” that is conserved throughout a series of changes in the material 
medium underlying a communication process. According to the model 
developed previously,  “ that conserved something ” is not information, 
but rather the permanence of a certain relation in the reconstructed form. 
Information is rather the process by which a form is conveyed through 
several different media (signs) in such a way that a relational structure 
is conserved throughout the process, even though the signifi cant aspects 
of the object ’ s form are continually reconstructed. Applying this idea in 
the context of the analysis offered in this section, it is not genetic infor-
mation that is conserved throughout the different tokens of DNA mol-
ecules (different material media) in different organisms and generations, 
but rather a relational structure in the reconstructed form, that is, a habit 
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or a tendency to build tokens of the same kind of protein (in the case of 
a protein-coding gene) based on the signs available in DNA. These signs 
themselves can only harbor potential information. Genetic information, 
in turn, is taken to be the process by which the permanence of a relational 
structure is conveyed to a new token of a protein, that is, the whole 
process through which genes as signs in DNA (entailing the potentiality 
of genetic information as a process) are irreducibly related to objects and 
interpretants. 
 Even if one concedes that this argument shows an advantage of our 
account in relation to the one given by Maynard Smith and Szathm á ry, 
there is a further issue to be considered. Both accounts must meet the 
important requirement of providing an explanation of the representa-
tional character of signs. Prior to its application to biological processes, 
one might get the impression that the Peircean model of semiosis as a 
triadic relationship is simply a formal, uninterpreted schema. How, then, 
when applied to biological phenomena, does the representative character 
of a sign take on a specifi c meaning? On  Maynard Smith ’ s (2000) view, 
the representational nature of signs is explained by bringing in the idea 
of formal and/or fi nal causation. We are also sympathetic with these 
causal notions. Therefore, despite the difference pointed out earlier, there 
are also similarities between our account and Maynard Smith ’ s with 
regard to the explanation of the representational character of a sign in 
the biological sphere. However, a crucial advantage of the Peircean 
model is that what superfi cially looks like simply a formal defi nition of 
the logic structure of the sign is in fact also a pragmatic defi nition of the 
structure of meaning, because the meaning of a sign can be accessed only 
through that sign ’ s effect (interpretant) upon some interpreting system, 
such as a cell or an organism. Thus, if we offer an answer, for specifi c 
biological cases, to the problem of how a sign takes on a specifi c meaning, 
this does not mean that we should be committed to look for any mysteri-
ous additional emergence of the representative character of the sign. The 
origin of semantic-pragmatic meaning is embedded within the same 
triadic formal structure of the sign interpretation process, that is, as the 
process by which new interpretants are generated. 9 
 Transcription, RNA processing, and protein synthesis can be under-
stood, in semiotic terms, as processes of actualization of potential signs 
in protein-coding genes. When put into action, a protein-coding gene 
becomes part of effective semiosis, a triadic-dependent process by means 
of which the gene as a sign indicates a given functional product, synthe-
sized after splicing, mRNA edition, or any other complexity involved in 
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the path from a DNA stretch to a protein. This functional product has, 
in turn, an effect on the organism in which it is expressed (its fi nal inter-
pretant), participating in its adaptive interactions with its surroundings, 
and thus contributing to the presence of those potential signs in the next 
generation in a high frequency. Notice that we are not postulating any 
inversion of the central dogma (as if sequences of amino acids in proteins 
might determine sequences of nucleotides in DNA). We are referring, 
rather, to the effect of functional proteins on the likelihood that certain 
genes — certain signs mediating the process of the synthesis of those 
proteins — will be present in future generations. 
 The actualization of a gene depends on boundary conditions estab-
lished by a higher-level semiotic network, a network of signaling pro-
cesses that regulate gene expression, ultimately determining the likelihood 
of transcription of a given gene, or splicing of a given pre-mRNA accord-
ing to a particular pattern, or chemical modifi cation of a given protein 
in a manner that modulates its function in a particular way (e.g., by 
phosphorylation), and so on. A variety of regulatory mechanisms studied 
in cellular and molecular biology can be thus understood as composing 
a macrosemiotic environment, establishing boundary conditions that will 
downwardly determine which potential genes in a string of DNA will be 
actualized, entering into effective action in a cell. 
 This shows how several complexities involved in gene expression can 
be introduced in our analysis: boundary conditions established by this 
macrosemiotic environment will determine, for instance, which stretch 
of DNA will be read (e.g., allowing for an analysis of transcription of 
overlapped or nested genes), which pattern of RNA splicing or RNA 
editing will be instantiated in order to produce a particular mature 
mRNA (allowing for the subtleties of alternative RNA splicing or RNA 
editing to be taken into account), which functional protein will be effec-
tively constructed by the cell (allowing for chemical and/or structural 
modifi cations suffered by the primary amino acid sequence of a protein 
to be considered), and so on. 
 The regulatory infl uence of the macrosemiotic level — that is, of the 
network of signaling processes on interpretative subsystems, and, thus, 
on transcription, splicing, translation — shows that we have to ultimately 
consider the whole cell as participating in the network necessary for the 
actualization of potential genes in DNA. The cellular network of semiotic 
processes is, in turn, highly responsive to environmental factors, given 
the semi-open nature of living systems. Accordingly, genes, as potential 
signs in DNA, are actualized in response to regulatory dispositions 
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arising from a network of signaling pathways that elicit cellular specifi c 
responses to other signs arising from a hierarchy of contexts, environ-
ments, or, in our own terms, semiotic levels that can direct gene expres-
sion (i.e., establish boundary conditions for the selection of potential 
genes in DNA), ranging from systems of gene-gene interactions to organ-
isms, and passing through nucleus, cytoplasm, cell, cell surface, extracel-
lular matrix, morphogenetic fi elds, collective condensations of cells 
(blastemas), organs, and so on (see, for example,  Hall, 2001 ). Thus, the 
cell, as an interpreter, answers to an environmental cue or sign by means 
of a specifi c alteration of its internal states, triggered by a whole network 
of signal transduction culminating in a change at some level of gene 
regulation. (A semiotic analysis of signal transduction systems follows. 
See also  Bruni 2003 ,  Queiroz and El-Hani 2006b , and  El-Hani, Arnellos, 
and Queiroz 2007 .) These relations cannot be understood only in terms 
of molecular interactions taking place in networks of signal transduction, 
because this latter process crucially involves semiotic events, as the wide-
spread usage of information talk in modeling and explaining signaling 
pathways clearly suggests. 
 This semiotic analysis also allows us to offer an interesting account 
of the  “ transmission ” of information. It is not effective information that 
is being communicated when one observes, for instance,  “ vertical trans-
mission ” from parent to offspring. From the perspective of the model 
explained earlier, what is being communicated is only potential informa-
tion, that is, the potentiality of a process called  “ information. ” It is only 
this potentiality that can be said, as explained prior, to be carried by 
stretches of DNA. Signs in DNA will become elements in effective infor-
mation only when interpreted by the cell. Effective information itself 
cannot be carried from one system to another; only potential information 
can be carried by the fi rst correlates of triads, signs (which, in biological 
systems, are typically physicochemical entities). 
 This biosemiotic analysis of the genetic information system leads to 
the following conclusions: 
 1.  Genes should be treated as signs in DNA, which can have an effect 
on a cell only through a triadic-dependent process (semiosis). 
 2.  This process  is genetic information and involves more than just genes 
as signs in DNA but also objects and interpretants. 
 3.  Genetic information is the process by means of which a form in a 
dynamical object (a functional protein) is communicated to an interpre-
tant (the reconstruction of a specifi c sequence of amino acids in a cell) 
through signs in DNA. 
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 Let us now turn to the semiotic modeling of signaling systems to which 
we referred earlier when discussing the macrosemiotic environment 
within which genes, as potential signs in DNA, are downwardly selected 
to be actualized. 
 A Semiotic Model of Signal Transduction in B Cell Activation 
 The B cell antigen receptor (BCR) is a multiprotein complex consisting 
of a membrane-bound immunoglobulin molecule (mIg), the ligand-
binding part, and an Ig- α /Ig- β heterodimer associated with mIg, which 
acts as a signaling subunit and couples the receptor to intracellular signal 
transducer elements ( Reth and Wienands 1997 ). BCR has two functions 
in B cell activation ( Pierce 2002 ): it initiates signaling pathways that 
result in a series of intracellular processes in B cells, including changes 
in gene expression patterns, which lead, in turn, to the activated B cell 
phenotype, and it plays a role in the uptake and processing of antigens 
to be presented to T helper cells, which will assist B cells in achieving 
full activation. 
 Reth and Wienands (1997) proposed a model of molecular interac-
tions in signaling pathways based on functional defi nitions, intended to 
express the roles played by several elements in such pathways, acknowl-
edging (as it is proper of functional defi nitions) that different elements 
can fulfi ll those roles, or, to put it differently, be the occupants of the 
functional roles described in the model in different signaling processes. 
Such a functional model has the important characteristic of being general, 
in contrast to molecular, mechanistic models of particular signaling 
pathways. Reth and Wienands characterize eight functional categories 
of signaling elements ( fi gure 4.4 ). 
 Through signal transduction, living systems are capable of internal-
izing a cue to a certain aspect of the environment, by producing intracel-
lular signs in response to an extracellular sign.  Receptors play a central 
role in the processes through which a cell shows the capacity of answer-
ing to its surroundings. A receptor is in most cases a transmembrane 
protein that undergoes, when bound by an extracellular ligand, a con-
formational or topological (e.g., receptor aggregation) change that is, 
according to  Reth and Wienands ,  “ transmitted into the cell ” ( 1997 , 
456). But how is the molecular change suffered by the receptor com-
municated to the intracellular milieu? Here,  transducers enter into action. 
(But the issue of how the reference to the same cue or signal is maintained 
in the several changes in the material basis of the message remains open, 
and is indeed the matter to be dealt with in semiotic models.) Receptors 
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usually do not have an intracellular catalytic domain and are thus depen-
dent on transducer elements to carry out their signaling function. In most 
cases, transducers are enzymes physically associated with the intracel-
lular part of the receptor. In its resting state, the receptor often represses 
signaling activity of the associated transducer, but when it is activated 
by ligand binding, it suffers a conformational or topological change that 
leads to the activation of the transducer. 
 Each signaling pathway is switched on by the activity of the trans-
ducer and controlled by a  signal manager , the third category in  Reth and 
Wienands ’ (1997) model, located at the start of a particular signaling 
route. There can be several signaling pathways arising from the same 
receptor. There are cases in which a signal manager interacts directly 
with an effector, which instantiates an action under the regulation of the 
signaling pathway. When this is not the case, the signal manager activates 
a signal cascade consisting of one or several  signal processors .  Signal 
regulators , in turn, modify the effi ciency and duration of signals traveling 
down a signaling pathway, by amplifying or decreasing the signal. Such 
changes in the intensity of a signal can have major biological effects. As 
we can see in  fi gure 4.4 , signal regulators can act at the level of receptors, 
 Figure 4.4 
 Reth and Wienands ’ s (1997) functional model of signaling pathways. Arrows represent 
different types of functional connections between signaling elements. Dashed arrows rep-
resent regulatory relationships: R, receptor; T, transducer; SM, signal manager; SP, signal 
processor; SR, signal regulator; ST, signal terminator; Sc, scaffold protein; E, effector. 
R
T
Sc
SR
SM SM SM
STSP1
SP2 SP2 SP2
SP1 SP1
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transducers, signal managers or signal processors, that is, at all func-
tional levels of the signaling system. 
 Signal transduction occurs in an organized microenvironment, in 
which different elements of a signaling pathway are connected both 
functionally and spatially. This architecture of signaling elements can be 
established before or after the activation of a receptor. In the former 
case,  scaffold or  adaptor proteins play an important role in organizing 
the spatial and functional architecture of signaling elements, by bringing 
them together in a preformed protein complex. 
 Even if the stimulus is persistent, signal transduction through 
many receptors is terminated after some time, due to the activity of 
 signal terminators , which can be phosphatases as well as kinases or 
GTPases. They establish a feedback loop that changes the activity 
of the receptor, transducer, and/or a particular signal manager. At 
the endpoint of a signaling pathway, one fi nds one or several  effectors , 
which can be enzymes, transcription factors, or cytoskeletal elements. 
They are the elements whose behavior is modulated by the signaling 
pathway. 
 We stated previously that signal transduction is a process through 
which living systems can answer in a regular and (usually but not always) 
adaptive manner to the environment, by producing intracellular signs in 
response to extracellular signs. The mechanistic interactions involved in 
this process are aptly modeled by Reth and Wienands in functional (and, 
thus, properly general) terms, but, if the series of mechanistic interactions 
that take place in a signaling pathway amounts to a process of  signal 
transduction , a description in terms of molecular interactions or even 
functional defi nitions will not be enough. It is not that some additional 
element, besides the molecules themselves, should be added to the mecha-
nistic and material aspect of the signaling pathway; rather, what should 
be added to the picture is the kind of relation explained earlier, a semiotic 
relation by means of which a molecule such as an antigen can be a sign 
that stands for something else — say, a pathogen — and, in turn, lead to 
the production, within the living system, of other (signaling) molecules 
that stand in the same relation to that object in which the antigen itself 
stood. Only in this manner we will be able to explain not only the 
molecular interactions and functional roles in a pathway, but also the 
maintenance of the reference to the same object, namely the pathogen, 
while several different signaling molecules are engaged in the pathway. 
This is clearly a fundamental property to account for, if we want to 
explain why this is a signal transduction process. 
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 In more detail, to model in Peircean terms the maintenance of the 
reference to an extracellular sign throughout the several changes in 
intracellular signs that characterize a signaling pathway, one should 
consider how the processes described by Reth and Wienands instantiate 
a triadic relation in which a receptor that acts as an interpreting system 
recognizes a sign (the extracellular signal, an antigen), which refers to 
an object in the world (a dynamical object, such as a pathogen) through 
a feature semiotically available in its representation (the molecular form 
of the antigen, as an immediate object that indicates the pathogen, as a 
dynamical object). Receptors act as interpreting systems by activating 
transducers in response to ligands (signs). That is, the receptor commu-
nicates the sign process to the interior by coupling to transducers, cata-
lytic molecules that trigger the production of another sign inside the cell 
in response to the extracellular sign. This subsequent sign is the inter-
pretant of a fi rst triadic relation, and it takes the role of a sign for a 
subsequent triadic relation, allowing signaling to proceed. This happens 
through a series of intracellular signs that can diverge, if several signaling 
pathways are triggered by the transduction of a single extracellular sign, 
and are amplifi ed by signal regulators along the pathways. Each pathway 
ends in an effector, which produces the fi nal interpretant in the process, 
an action through which sign interpretation has an effect on the cell 
phenotype. 
 Let us take now a closer look at initiation events at the BCR signaling 
system.  Figure 4.5 presents a model of the main events at stake. In resting 
B cells, BCR is excluded from membrane domains (lipid rafts) that con-
centrate the transducer  Lyn . In the absence of antigen, the BCR monomer 
has a weak affi nity for lipid rafts, but antigen binding makes BCR mol-
ecules associate with each other, increasing affi nity for those domains. 
Stable residency in lipid rafts results in association with  Lyn , which 
phosphorylates BCR, initiating several signaling pathways. In  fi gure 4.5 , 
another kinase is shown, named  Syk , which initiates one of the signaling 
pathways resulting from BCR activation. 
 As we saw earlier, when interpreted from a Peircean perspective, 
an antigen is a sign that stands for something else, such as a pathogen, 
and a receptor such as BCR acts as an interpreting system in the cell 
membrane, triggering processes by means of which new signs — that is, 
interpretants — are produced inside the B cell. The fi rst interpretant in 
this case is the phosphorylated state of BCR, which is a sign that stands 
for the pathogen as the antigen itself stood for it. This generates a new 
triad, linked to the previous one by the double role played by the 
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 Figure 4.5 
 Model of the initiating events in the signal-transduction pathways leading to B cell activa-
tion (from  Pierce 2002 ) 
phosphorylated state of BCR, which is both the interpretant of a fi rst 
triad, and the sign of a second triad ( fi gure 4.6 ). We are dealing, thus, 
with the I-S transition, a basic process underlying the generation of 
chains of triads. When the I-S transition takes place, the aspect of the 
pathogen which was represented in the antigen (O i ) is now represented 
in the phosphorylated state of BCR (O i  + 1 ). To put it differently, follow-
ing the I-S transition, there is a change in the occupant of the functional 
role of O ( fi gure 4.6 ). 
 It is this latter change that makes it possible for the same entity or 
process to be kept as a stable referent throughout the signaling process, 
despite the several changes in the material bases of signaling, that is, in 
the signs involved. The maintenance of the reference to the pathogen in 
a signaling pathway can be modeled as such changes of occupants 
because all the immediate objects in a chain of triads stand for the same 
dynamical object — the pathogen. The fact that the reference to the same 
dynamical object is maintained can be explained on the basis that the 
latter is, in a Peircean framework, the primary constraining factor in 
semiosis, because its form — understood as a regularity or habit — is com-
municated through several semiotic, triadic relations. Such a communica-
tion of the form of the dynamical object, as semiotically available in a 
series of immediate objects, is  information in a signaling pathway. After 
all, information is conceived, in the Peircean framework developed here, 
as a triadic-dependent process through which a form embodied in the 
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 Figure 4.6 
 A model of one of the signaling pathways triggered by activated BCR as a chain of triads.
Notice the I-S transition and the changes in the occupants of the functional role of O. The 
maintenance of the reference to the pathogen in a signaling pathway is modeled in terms 
of these changes of occupants, because all the immediate objects stand for the same dynami-
cal object, the pathogen, throughout semiotic, triadic relations that communicates the form 
of the object and are conceived, according to the theoretical framework developed here, 
as  information in a signaling pathway. 
I-S transitions
Changes in the occupants of the functional role of O
Si = antigen
Oi+1 = aspect of the
pathogen represented in
phosphorylated BCR
Oi+2 = aspect of
the pathogen
represented in
IP3
Oi = aspect of
the pathogen
represented
in the antigen
Ii+1 y Si+2 =
e.g., IP3
Ii+2 = e.g., Ca
2+
release from
endoplasmic
reticulum
Ii y Si+1 =
phosphorylated
BCR
object in a regular way is communicated to an interpretant through the 
mediation of a sign. 
 Biochemical and genetic evidence has shown that  Syk has a key role 
in a well-defi ned pathway of B cell activation, which results in the release 
of Ca 2+ from the endoplasmic reticulum ( Reth and Wienands 1997 ). In 
this case, the binding of  Syk to the phosphorylated BCR makes a specifi c 
interpretative process proceed. When  Syk is activated, it leads to the 
activation of another enzyme, phospholipase C γ ( PLC- γ ), which is an 
effector, converting the membrane component phosphatidylinositol 
4,5-biphosphate into the two second messengers diacylglycerol (DAG) 
and inositol 1,4,5-triphosphate (IP3). This illustrates a case of divergence 
of intracellular signals, modeled in semiotic terms by means of the 
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production of more than one interpretant from a single sign, namely, the 
phosphorylated state of BCR. 
 DAG remains attached to the inner side of the plasma membrane and 
recruits and activates the cytosolic protein kinase C (PKC). IP3 binds to 
receptors on the endoplasmic reticulum, causing the release of Ca 2+ ions. 
The release of Ca 2+ ions is a new interpretant in the signaling pathway 
managed by  Syk . The number of different PKC substrates (for example, 
CD20, c-Raf, I κ B) and the multifunctional role of Ca 2+ ions in cell 
metabolism, and also in signaling, make it clear how an original sign-
response can be broadly diversifi ed by the signaling systems of a cell. As 
we can see in  fi gure 4.7 , the pathway managed by  Syk in which IP3 is 
involved does not end in Ca 2+ ions, but continues through further I-S 
transitions, which we will not model here for reasons of space. The fi nal 
interpretant of this (and other) signaling process amounts to the regula-
tion of gene expression so as to lead to B cell activation. 
 DAG and IP3 stand for the pathogen in the same way as the antigen 
and the phosphorylated state of BCR stood, maintaining the reference 
 Figure 4.7 
 Several intracellular signaling pathways are initiated by the cross-linking of B cell receptors 
by antigen ( Goodridge and Harnett 2005 ). In the center of the fi gure, one can see the 
signaling pathways modeled above, involving  Syk ,  PLC γ , IP3, and Ca 2+ release. Notice the 
integration between this signaling pathway and the one involving DAG, which leads to 
the activation of  cPKC and  nPKC . Notice, also, that the pathway involving IP3 and Ca 2+ 
regulates in the end patterns of gene expression in B cells. 
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of the signaling process through changes of the occupants of the func-
tional role of the immediate object. IP3, for instance, acts as a sign to a 
subsequent triad, triggering the production of Ca 2+ , which in turn will 
occupy the role of sign in a further triad, up to the fi nal interpretant of 
this particular semiotic process. 
 From a global perspective, the overall result of the semiotic process 
modeled previously can be grasped in terms of a triad containing 
the antigen as a sign, the pathogen as represented, say, in the three-
dimensional form of the antigen as an immediate object, and changes in 
the pattern of gene expression in B cells, as an interpretant ( fi gure 4.8 ). 
 To stress the necessity of semiotic modeling of signaling processes, we 
can ask why molecules such as DAG and IP3 can be called  “ second mes-
sengers. ” What is the  “ message ” and how is it preserved in them? The 
message refers to the presence of a non-self entity — for instance, a patho-
gen — within the organism. But how is the reference to such an entity 
preserved in the messengers? In order to successfully model the mainte-
nance of reference throughout the process, we should go beyond the 
pairwise or dyadic interactions between molecules and their substrates, 
and build a semiotic, triadic model capable of showing how the reference 
to a non-self entity external to the cell can be maintained during the 
processing of signs within the cell. 
 A semiotic analysis allows us to go beyond a metaphorical usage of 
the expression  “ second messenger ” : DAG and IP3 are second messengers 
precisely because they are interpretants produced as a result of the pro-
cessing of an extracellular sign (a  “ fi rst messenger ” ), in this case, an 
 Figure 4.8 
 A global semiotic analysis of a semiotic process triggered by antigen-binding to BCR 
S = antigen
I = changes in gene
expression patterns
O = semiotically available
aspect of the pathogen
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antigen. In turn, the changes of the occupants of the functional role of 
O in chains of triads corresponding to the signaling pathways managed 
by  Syk show how the reference to the pathogen is maintained, while the 
material bases of the message — namely, the signs — keep changing 
throughout the process. 
 To put it differently, we argue that to understand signaling processes, 
we need at least three properly connected, but different models: 
 1.  Molecular, mechanistic models of particular signaling pathways, in 
which the molecular interactions that take place in them are properly 
represented and explained 
 2.  General, functional models, such as the one proposed by  Reth and 
Wienands (1997) , which represent and explain in general terms how 
different occupants can play the several functional roles in a signaling 
pathway 
 3.  Semiotic models, such as the one proposed by  El-Hani, Arnellos, and 
Queiroz (2007) , and reviewed and extended here, which represent and 
explain in semiotic terms how different occupants can play the same 
semiotic roles in a signaling pathway 
 Finally, consider the role of signaling processes, as a higher-level semiotic 
network, in the actualization of genes as potential signs, by affecting the 
likelihood of their transcription, or the patterns of splicing of their pre-
mRNA, or posttranslational changes of their functional products. 
Accordingly, the next step in our research will be to employ the basic 
framework developed herein to model signal transduction in connection 
with gene actualization, combining in a single model the accounts we 
developed in separate papers. 
 Concluding Remarks 
 The framework for building a theory of biological information presented 
here is consistent with the general picture of genetic information and 
signaling processes in genetics and molecular biology, with the funda-
mental differences that fi rst, a concept of information is explicitly for-
mulated within a heuristically powerful theoretical framework, and 
second, information is on these grounds conceptualized as a process. 
Consequently, to make this semiotic framework and the current structure 
of genetics and molecular biology compatible, it is necessary to conceive 
the latter in more process-oriented terms. This is a fruitful avenue to be 
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pursued in order to build a framework for biology that is more compat-
ible with the increasingly complex and dynamic nature of biological 
systems revealed by recent advances in the biological sciences (for some 
suggestions to the same effect, see, e.g.,  Neumann-Held 2001 ;  Keller 
2005 ). We consider the compatibility of our semiotic analyses with the 
framework of genetics and molecular biology as a strong feature. Of 
course, the pros and cons of complementing the current models in genet-
ics and molecular biology with a semiotic concept of information is a 
matter for further investigation. 
 We have argued that semiotic modeling is a necessary counterpart to 
functional and mechanistic models of genetic and signaling systems. The 
conceptual tools offered by Peircean semiotics, along with the biosemi-
otic models that they enable us to construct, can deepen our understand-
ing of biological phenomena that are described by a communicational 
and informational vocabulary. This is particularly important in a time 
in which biology is increasingly seen as a science of information. It is 
always useful to remind ourselves that at present we do not have an 
established general notion of biological information (despite the roles 
that the meaning-free concept of information offered by the mathemati-
cal theory of communication can play in biological research), and it is a 
basic contention of this work that biosemiotics can help in building a 
semantic/pragmatic concept of biological information. 
 Notes 
 1.  In the body of the chapter, Peirce ’ s works will be referred to as CP (followed 
by volume and paragraph number) for quotations from the  Collected Papers of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, 1866 – 1913 ( Peirce 1932 – 1935 ); EP (followed by volume 
and page number) for quotations from  The essential Peirce: Selected philosophi-
cal writings, 1893 – 1913 (Peirce  1998) ; MS (followed by the number of the 
manuscript) for quotations from  The Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of 
Charles S. Peirce ( Peirce 1967 ); and SS (followed by page number) for quotations 
from  Semiotic and Signifi cs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and 
Victoria Lady Welby  ( Peirce 1977 ). 
 2.  A review of the history of biosemiotics can be found in  Favareau 2007 and 
 Kull 1999 . See also  Emmeche, Kull, and Stjernfelt 2002 . 
 3.  In the Peircean framework, the interpretant is the effect produced by a sign. 
The concept will be explained in more detail later in this chapter in  “ Semiosis 
and Information Processing. ” 
 4.  If one prefers not to use the category of causality to explain these aspects of 
living systems, one may speak of formal and fi nal  determination , in a framework 
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that acknowledges the existence of other kinds of determination in natural 
systems, besides causal determination (see  El-Hani and Queiroz 2005 ). 
 5.  For further discussion of the categories, see  Hookway 1985 ,  Murphey 1993 , 
and  Potter 1967/1997 . 
 6.  By  “ learning ” here, we mean the result of both ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
processes that can lead a system to improve its sign-interpreter abilities. 
 7.  Also, with the concept of experience ( CP 1:537 ). 
 8.  A detailed semiotic model of transcription and translation is put forward by 
 El-Hani, Queiroz, and Emmeche (2006) . 
 9.  Much more could be said about Maynard Smith ’ s views about biological 
information and the concept of representation, generally speaking, but this 
would require more space than we can devote to this issue in the framework of 
the current chapter. 
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